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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation was written as part of the LLM In Transnational And 
European Commercial Law And Alternative Dispute Resolution at the International 
Hellenic University. 
The goal of my dissertation is to develop the scope and operation of the unbundling in 
electricity sector and in particular on the TSO’s point of view. The European 
Commission and the Parliament struggle reach the goals of “Europe 2020 Strategy” 
through a secure and competitive environment. The correct transposition of the 
European electricity legislation in all Member States is  not yet complete. Hence, the 
Third Internal Energy Market Package was adopted in 2009 to accelerate investments 
in energy infrastructure, enhance cross border trade and access to diversified sources 
of energy. Market concentration isn’t yet fully repealed in the European Union, 
nevertheless we have high hopes that the three options EU has introduced (ownership 
unbundling, independent system operator (ISO) and independent transmission 
operators (ITO)) to weaken the market power of the biggest electricity firms, will 
work out.  
Furthermore, it is important to examine the case of the Greek TSO, ADMIE. 
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A.INTRODUCTION 
It is true that nowadays life without electricity would be definitely 
uncontemplated. Electricity is the entity that is nearly used for any aspect of human 
life - from heating our homes, to cooking and using electric devices.1 It is however a 
scarce commodity that not only has to be produced, but also has to be transported via 
grids and distributed to the final consumers.2 Its generation is originated by both 
primary and renewable energy sources that are not evenly distributed around the globe 
and as a result, there is no equality of cost among different countries, as far as its 
production is concerned.3 
The fact that electricity cannot be stored makes its delivery to consumers a 
complicated issue. To elaborate, its delivery is done through a network of grids to 
which all actors (from producers to consumers) are simultaneously connected.4 The 
moment the power produced enters the power pool of the grid, it becomes 
indistinguishable from any other sort of power otherwise generated.5 Furthermore, we 
should bear in mind that electricity is consumed extraordinarily faster than produced 
and its storage in the system doesn’t last more than a tenth of a second, which is the 
                                                          
1 Janusz Bielecki, Melaku Geboye Desta, Electricity Trade in Europe, Review of the 
Economic and Regulatory Challenges, International Energy and Resources Law and 
Policy Series, p. xiii, 2004, Kluwer Law International.  
2 Janusz Bielecki, Melaku Geboye Desta, Electricity Trade in Europe, Review of the 
Economic and Regulatory Challenges, International Energy and Resources Law and 
Policy Series, p. xiii, 2004, Kluwer Law International. 
3 Janusz Bielecki, Melaku Geboye Desta, Electricity Trade in Europe, Review of the 
Economic and Regulatory Challenges, International Energy and Resources Law and 
Policy Series, p. xiii, 2004, Kluwer Law International. 
4 Janusz Bielecki, Melaku Geboye Desta, Electricity Trade in Europe, Review of the 
Economic and Regulatory Challenges, International Energy and Resources Law and 
Policy Series, p. 6, 2004, Kluwer Law International. 
5 Janusz Bielecki, Melaku Geboye Desta, Electricity Trade in Europe, Review of the 
Economic and Regulatory Challenges, International Energy and Resources Law and 
Policy Series, p. 6, 2004, Kluwer Law International. 
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reason why generation capacity has to fluctuate synchronously with power demand. In 
other words, there must be a balance between the electricity generated and the 
electricity used at every moment. 6 
B. THE BEGINNING OF ENERGY MARKET LIBERALIZATION 
During the 1990s,7 the majority of national electricity markets usually evolved 
vertically integrated geographic monopolies that were either owned by the states or 
were privately-owned and regulated as natural monopolies. 8  The aforementioned 
firms had turned to be the exclusive suppliers of electricity to any sort of consumer, 
resident of a specific geographic area.9 At that time, after eight years of controversial 
negotiations10 the European Union in collaboration with the Member States decided to 
initiate a reform programme of liberalization of the above markets, so as they become 
open to competition.11 To be specific, the Commission made a proposal for a directive  
that would reform sectoral practices and create an Internal Energy Market based on 
                                                          
6 Janusz Bielecki, Melaku Geboye Desta, Electricity Trade in Europe, Review of the 
Economic and Regulatory Challenges, International Energy and Resources Law and 
Policy Series, p. 6, 2004, Kluwer Law International. 
7 European Commission, Competition, Energy, Energy and Environment, Overview, 
Liberalisation of the electricity and gas markets, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/energy/overview_en.html.  
8  Paul L. Joskow, Lessons Learned From Electricity Market Liberalization, The 
Energy Journal, Special Issue, The Future of Electricity: Papers in Honor of David 
Newbery, p. 10, 2008, IAEE. 
9  Paul L. Joskow, Lessons Learned From Electricity Market Liberalization, The 
Energy Journal, Special Issue, The Future of Electricity: Papers in Honor of David 
Newbery, p. 11, 2008, IAEE. 
10 Rainer Eising, Policy Learning in Embedded Negotiations: Explaining EU 
Electricity Liberalization, International Organization 56, 1, The IO Foundation and 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,   p. 85, 2002. 
11 European Commission, Competition, Energy, Energy and Environment, Overview, 
Liberalisation of the electricity and gas markets, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/energy/overview_en.html.  
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Article 100a (EEC), under the consultation of both the European Parliament and the 
Council.12  
In order to comprehend the aforementioned project, we should first investigate 
on the ultimate goals of the various liberalization policies.13 It would not be wise to 
say that “de-regulation” or “competition” per se,  are the fundamental incentives of 
the electricity liberalization programme, 14  since it would be preferable to consider 
them as the means for the achievement of further, more crucial performance goals. 15 
To make things clear, these further initiatives couldn’t be other than the creation of 
new institutional arrangements for the electricity sector, that would entail various 
net benefits not only for the society as a whole, but also for consumers individually16. 
An example of the aforementioned could be the increase of efficiency of electricity 
production and consumption in consistency with the preservation of the 
environment. 17Benefits as such, would arise in the context of competitive wholesale 
power markets providing: a) better control over the construction and the operating 
costs of the generating capacity, together with b) innovation encouragement as 
regards the technology of supply and c) shifting of the various risks (technology 
                                                          
12  Rainer Eising, Policy Learning in Embedded Negotiations: Explaining EU 
Electricity Liberalization, International Organization 56, 1, The IO Foundation and 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,   p. 85–120, 2002.  
13 Jean Michel Glachant, Francois Leveque, Electricity Reform in Europe Towards a 
Single Energy Market, p. xiv, 2009, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. 
14 Jean Michel Glachant, Francois Leveque, Electricity Reform in Europe Towards a 
Single Energy Market, p. xiv, 2009, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. 
15 Jean Michel Glachant, Francois Leveque, Electricity Reform in Europe Towards a 
Single Energy Market, p. xiv, 2009, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. 
16  Paul L. Joskow, Lessons Learned From Electricity Market Liberalization, The 
Energy Journal, Special Issue, The Future of Electricity: Papers in Honor of David 
Newbery, p. 11, 2008, IAEE. 
17 Jean Michel Glachant, Francois Leveque, Electricity Reform in Europe Towards a 
Single Energy Market, p. xiv, 2009, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. 
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choice, construction cost and operating “mistakes”) that could potentially appear from 
consumers to suppliers. 18 
The liberalization programme further imports, the “retail competition” or 
“third party access” ability in the electricity sector, pursuant to which, a) consumers 
are allowed  to choose the retail power supplier that offers the price/service quality 
that best matches the needs of consumers and b) generators and intermediaries in 
competition, are allowed to offer their services to consumers. 19 Although some parts 
of the total costs of electricity supply – distribution and transmission – would still be 
regulated as legal monopolies, the reformation of the traditional regulations 
concerning the arrangement of distribution and transmission networks has been 
considered as the cornerstone of the introduction to the wholesale and retail 
competition. 20  Accordingly, the privatization of companies that distribute and 
transmit electricity, together with the application of performance-based regulatory 
mechanisms result into the imposition of hard budget constraints on regulated 
network companies , forcing them to reduce costs and ameliorate the quality of the 
provided service. Finally, it should be underpinned that the prerequisite for the 
achievement of all the aforementioned goals is the existence of a well-functioning 
                                                          
18 Jean Michel Glachant, Francois Leveque, Electricity Reform in Europe Towards a 
Single Energy Market, p. xiv, 2009, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited // Paul L. 
Joskow, Lessons Learned From Electricity Market Liberalization, The Energy 
Journal, Special Issue, The Future of Electricity: Papers in Honor of David Newbery, 
p. 11, 2008, IAEE. 
19 Jean Michel Glachant, Francois Leveque, Electricity Reform in Europe Towards a 
Single Energy Market, p. xiv, 2009, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited // Paul L. 
Joskow, Lessons Learned From Electricity Market Liberalization, The Energy 
Journal, Special Issue, The Future of Electricity: Papers in Honor of David Newbery, 
p. 11, 2008, IAEE. 
20 Jean Michel Glachant, Francois Leveque, Electricity Reform in Europe Towards a 
Single Energy Market, p. xiv, 2009, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited // Paul L. 
Joskow, Lessons Learned From Electricity Market Liberalization, The Energy 
Journal, Special Issue, The Future of Electricity: Papers in Honor of David Newbery, 
p. 11, 2008, IAEE. 
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infrastructure, supporting both transmission and distribution networks, 
regulated under the proper terms and conditions of access to and use.  
B.1. A SUCCESSFULL REFORM 
As many adequate authors have suggested21, the “orthodox line” to achieve the 
reconstruction, regulatory renovation and expansion of the power markets is not 
arbitrary.22 On the contrary it is a specific Community path involving several aspects. 
Starting with the privatization of state-owned electricity monopolies which creates 
hard budget constraints and urges for improvement,23 the next step is the vertical 
division, in other words, the unbundling of the competitive segments of an industry 
( the generation, marketing and retail supply) from the non-competitive ones that will 
continue to be regulated (  distribution,  transmission,  system operations ). 24 
                                                          
21 Michael G.Pollitt, Electricity Liberalisation in the European Union: A Progress 
Report, Electricity Policy Research Group, Working Paper 0929, Cambridge Working 
Paper in Economics 0953, p. 4-5, University of Cambridge //  Paul L. Joskow, 
Lessons Learned From Electricity Market Liberalization, The Energy Journal, Special 
Issue, The Future of Electricity: Papers in Honor of David Newbery, p. 12-13, 2008, 
IAEE  // European Commission, Competition, Energy, Energy and Environment, 
Overview, Liberalisation of the electricity and gas markets, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/energy/overview_en.html. 
22  Paul L. Joskow, Lessons Learned From Electricity Market Liberalization, The 
Energy Journal, Special Issue, The Future of Electricity: Papers in Honor of David 
Newbery, p. 12, 2008, IAEE. 
23  Paul L. Joskow, Lessons Learned From Electricity Market Liberalization, The 
Energy Journal, Special Issue, The Future of Electricity: Papers in Honor of David 
Newbery, p. 12, 2008, IAEE // European Commission, Competition, Energy, Energy 
and Environment, Overview, Liberalization of the electricity and gas markets, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/energy/overview_en.html //Michael G.Pollitt, 
Electricity Liberalisation in the European Union: A Progress Report, Electricity 
Policy Research Group, Working Paper 0929, Cambridge Working Paper in 
Economics 0953, p. 4-5, University of Cambridge.  
24  Paul L. Joskow, Lessons Learned From Electricity Market Liberalization, The 
Energy Journal, Special Issue, The Future of Electricity: Papers in Honor of David 
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Furthermore, the obligation of operators of non-competitive industrial segments to 
allow third party access to the infrastructure, the opening of the market to suppliers 
together with the establishment of the freedom of customers to choose whoever 
supplier they wish and better fits their interests. 25 Finally, the existence of an 
independent regulatory authority providing good information about the costs, the 
quality of provided services and comparative performance of the supplying 
enterprises, with the capacity to enforce various regulatory requirements pursuant to 
this information should be considered highly important.26 
B.2. THE FIRST ELECTRICITY DIRECTIVE 
The liberalization of energy markets in Europe is a process that started during 
the 1900s, in order to achieve the ultimate objective, the creation of an EU-wide 
integrated energy market. 27  Although it is true that many important results have 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Newbery, p. 12, 2008, IAEE // European Commission, Competition, Energy, Energy 
and Environment, Overview, Liberalization of the electricity and gas markets, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/energy/overview_en.html // Michael G.Pollitt, 
Electricity Liberalisation in the European Union: A Progress Report, Electricity 
Policy Research Group, Working Paper 0929, Cambridge Working Paper in 
Economics 0953, p. 4-5, University of Cambridge. 
25 European Commission, Competition, Energy, Energy and Environment, Overview, 
Liberalization of the electricity and gas markets, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/energy/overview_en.html  
// Paul L. Joskow, Lessons Learned From Electricity Market Liberalization, The 
Energy Journal, Special Issue, The Future of Electricity: Papers in Honor of David 
Newbery, p. 12, 2008, IAEE // Michael G.Pollitt, Electricity Liberalisation in the 
European Union: A Progress Report, Electricity Policy Research Group, Working 
Paper 0929, Cambridge Working Paper in Economics 0953, p. 4-5, University of 
Cambridge. 
26  Paul L. Joskow, Lessons Learned From Electricity Market Liberalization, The 
Energy Journal, Special Issue, The Future of Electricity: Papers in Honor of David 
Newbery, p. 12, 2008, IAEE. 
27 Delia Vasilica Rotaru, A Glance At The European Energy Market Liberalization, 
CES Working Papers, p.100, 2013, Volume 5 (1). 
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occurred from the whole process, we could not call it a complete success story since 
there are parameters, such as various differences between the Member States that 
delay the achievement of its final objectives. 28 
Taking things from the beginning, the first Electricity Directive was drafted in 
1992 and passed as Directive 96/92/EC (First Electricity Directive) in 1996.29 The 
Directive established the basic principles and rules for the function of a liberalized 
energy market30, such as the principles of free electricity trade and third party network 
access between Member States along with the idea of abandonment of national 
sovereignty over electrical energy. 31 The ultimate incentive of the Directive was not 
only the establishment of rules relative to the efficient generation of electricity, 
transmission, distribution and supply32, but also rules that arrange and systematize the 
electricity sector, market access and the authorization procedures for constructing new 
generating facilities.33  
Furthermore, the Directive underpinned both, that vertically integrated 
monopolistic companies had to unbundle and that new system operators in the 
context of Distribution and Transmission had to be created, separately from the 
                                                          
28 Delia Vasilica Rotaru, A Glance At The European Energy Market Liberalization, 
CES Working Papers, p.100, 2013, Volume 5 (1). 
29 Pavle Jakovac, B. Sc., Electricity Directives And Evolution Of The Eu Internal 
Electricity Market, “Economic impacts of regulatory reforms in electricity sector” n° 
081-0361557-1455, financed by Croatian Ministry of Science, Education and Sports, 
p. 317, 2012. 
30 Theodore Panagos, The Unbundling In The Energy Sector Companies, Sakkoulas 
Editions, p.16, 2011. 
31 Pavle Jakovac, B. Sc., Electricity Directives And Evolution Of The Eu Internal 
Electricity Market, “Economic impacts of regulatory reforms in electricity sector” n° 
081-0361557-1455, financed by Croatian Ministry of Science, Education and Sports, 
p. 317, 2012. 
32 Theodore Panagos, The Unbundling In The Energy Sector Companies, Sakkoulas 
Editions, p.17, 2011. 
33 Ivan Tominov Liberalization of the electricity market – is it meeting expectations?, 
Journal of Energy, 57 (3), p. 256-299,  2008. 
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competitive parts of the electricity sector.34  Regarding the unbundling, the European 
legislator considered that there should be a separate administrator of the transmission 
system and a separate one for the distribution network in order to protect both the 
producers’ and consumers’ interests by guarding against the risk that integrated 
companies would use their ownership of the network to unfairly give advantage to 
their generation and/or retail businesses.3536  As far as retail competition is concerned, 
the consumers of electricity were, after the enforcement of the Directive able to 
choose and change their suppliers, resulting into the opening of European electricity 
market to foreign suppliers.37However, a completely opened market was not actually 
imposed due to protection of national or local solidarity through various forms of state 
intervention. 38  Finally, Directive 96/92/EC also introduced the issue of network 
access, obliging the Transmission and Distribution System Operators to grant non-
discriminatory network access regardless of whether we are talking about 
negotiated third party access, regulated third party access or even a “single buyer”, 
who would be responsible for the purchase of the country’s electricity and the 
determination of power plants to be used.  39 
                                                          
34 Pavle Jakovac, B. Sc., Electricity Directives And Evolution Of The Eu Internal 
Electricity Market, “Economic impacts of regulatory reforms in electricity sector” n° 
081-0361557-1455, financed by Croatian Ministry of Science, Education and Sports, 
p. 318, 2012. 
35 Theodore Panagos, The Unbundling In The Energy Sector Companies, Sakkoulas 
Editions, p.17, 2011. 
36  Thomas Steve , The European Union Gas and Electricity Directives, Public 
Services International Research Institute, University of Greenwich, EPSU, p.10, 2005. 
37 Pavle Jakovac, B. Sc., Electricity Directives And Evolution Of The Eu Internal 
Electricity Market, “Economic impacts of regulatory reforms in electricity sector” n° 
081-0361557-1455, financed by Croatian Ministry of Science, Education and Sports, 
p. 318, 2012. 
38 A. Višković , Elektroenergetika zemalja Europske Unije u devedesetima – uloga 
države u eri privatizaciji, Kigen, Zagreb,p. 33,  2005.  
39 Pavle Jakovac, B. Sc., Electricity Directives And Evolution Of The Eu Internal 
Electricity Market, “Economic impacts of regulatory reforms in electricity sector” n° 
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Despite the long desired harmonization on specific issues among the various 
Member States that any Directive provides, the introduction of Directive 96/92/EC 
had created many serious problems due to its asymmetry. 40 To elaborate, gaining 
access to a national market is equivalent to the market’s openness and the type of 
network access. 41  The unbundling obligation didn’t set as a precondition the 
independence of the network access actors, whereas due to the negotiated third party 
access option, the incumbent companies were able to keep their competitors away.  
As a result, the aforementioned formulated a concentrated retail sector and on the 
contrary, restricted retail competition, since competitive producers were kicked off 
national markets that already had a dominant generator. 42 
An overall comment on this first Electricity Directive would be that it 
undoubtedly opened the path to a new order as regards the electricity sector in 
Europe; however it only set out some minimum standards for effective competition 
without the parallel “construction” of an independent authority to supervise and 
ensure that the rules set out are respected and followed. 43In this way, the various 
Member States comply with the rules of the Directive at their discretion and the 
intentional harmonization remains a dead letter. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
081-0361557-1455, financed by Croatian Ministry of Science, Education and Sports, 
p. 318, 2012. 
40 Pavle Jakovac, B. Sc., Electricity Directives And Evolution Of The Eu Internal 
Electricity Market, “Economic impacts of regulatory reforms in electricity sector” n° 
081-0361557-1455, financed by Croatian Ministry of Science, Education and Sports, 
p. 318, 2012. 
41 A. Višković , Elektroenergetika zemalja Europske Unije u devedesetima – uloga 
države u eri privatizaciji, Kigen, Zagreb,p. 33,  2005. 
42  Thomas Steve , The European Union Gas and Electricity Directives, Public 
Services International Research Institute, University of Greenwich, EPSU, p.10, 2005. 
43 Pavle Jakovac, B. Sc., Electricity Directives And Evolution Of The Eu Internal 
Electricity Market, “Economic impacts of regulatory reforms in electricity sector” n° 
081-0361557-1455, financed by Croatian Ministry of Science, Education and Sports, 
p. 319, 2012. 
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B.3 THE SECOND ELECTRICITY DIRECTIVE 
The second Electricity Directive (2003/54/EC) along with Regulation 
1228/2003 that explicitly addressed cross-border issues for the first time, moved the 
internal electricity market a step forward.44 The Directive was passed in June 2003 
and had to be implemented until 2004. On the other hand,  the Regulation does not 
need transposition into national law, allowing less room to maneuver for Member 
States.45 The need for stricter rules of unbundling and for classification of the 
unbundling elements46 praised the idea of enhanced European energy policy that 
would promote  full market opening, supply of electricity to all sorts of consumers 
and better quality of service and business efficiency. 47  Furthermore, in order to 
promote third party access to the network and market competition, the European and 
national legislators foresaw the establishment of an independent regulatory body 
together with the necessary structural measures. 4849 
The areas of interest of the Second Electricity Directive were the following. 
As regards the construction of new electricity generation capacities, the Directive 
introduced the rule of authorization50 and alternatively tendering.51 Furthermore, in 
                                                          
44  Leonardo Meeus, Ronnie Belmans, Electricity market integration in Europe, 
Bourses d’énergie, University of Leuven (KUL), p.6, 2008.   
45  Leonardo Meeus, Ronnie Belmans, Electricity market integration in Europe, 
Bourses d’énergie, University of Leuven (KUL), p.6, 2008.   
46 Theodore Panagos, The Unbundling In The Energy Sector Companies, Sakkoulas 
Editions, p.19, 2011. 
47 Pavle Jakovac, B. Sc., Electricity Directives And Evolution Of The Eu Internal 
Electricity Market, “Economic impacts of regulatory reforms in electricity sector” n° 
081-0361557-1455, financed by Croatian Ministry of Science, Education and Sports, 
p. 320, 2012. 
48 Theodore Panagos, The Unbundling In The Energy Sector Companies, Sakkoulas 
Editions, p.19, 2011  
49  Leonardo Meeus, Ronnie Belmans, Electricity market integration in Europe, 
Bourses d’énergie, University of Leuven (KUL), p.6, 2008.   
50  Thomas Steve , The European Union Gas and Electricity Directives, Public 
Services International Research Institute, University of Greenwich, EPSU, p.11, 2005. 
15 
 
order to achieve a fully opened electricity market the Directive highlighted the 
importance of non-discriminatory network access that was granted by the 
Transmission or Distribution System Operators which had to be legally separated 
entities from the ones that produce and supply electricity.52 Finally, as far as the 
network access was concerned, the negotiated third party access and the single buyer 
option were withdrawn since they were never adopted.   
The reasons behind the Second Electricity Directive and its implications 
varied. The avoidance of discrimination and cross-subsidization between 
monopolistic and competitive activities was of fundamental importance because the 
First Electricity Directive was insufficient to contest discriminatory trends and 
behaviors. 53  This meant that the Distribution System Operator (DSO) and the 
Transmission System Operator (TSO) activities had to be carried out by legally 
separate companies, although an integrated company could still own a TSO or DSO 
company as well as a generation infrastructure. 54  However, despite the further 
establishment and strengthening of the unbundling obligation, the Directive didn’t 
mention the specific measures for breaking up dominant companies.55  
                                                                                                                                                                      
51 Pavle Jakovac, B. Sc., Electricity Directives And Evolution Of The Eu Internal 
Electricity Market, “Economic impacts of regulatory reforms in electricity sector” n° 
081-0361557-1455, financed by Croatian Ministry of Science, Education and Sports, 
p. 320, 2012. 
52 Pavle Jakovac, B. Sc., Electricity Directives And Evolution Of The Eu Internal 
Electricity Market, “Economic impacts of regulatory reforms in electricity sector” n° 
081-0361557-1455, financed by Croatian Ministry of Science, Education and Sports, 
p. 320, 2012. 
53 Theodore Panagos, The Unbundling In The Energy Sector Companies, Sakkoulas 
Editions, p.20, 2011. 
54  Thomas Steve , The European Union Gas and Electricity Directives, Public 
Services International Research Institute, University of Greenwich, EPSU, p.12, 2005. 
55 Pavle Jakovac, B. Sc., Electricity Directives And Evolution Of The Eu Internal 
Electricity Market, “Economic impacts of regulatory reforms in electricity sector” n° 
081-0361557-1455, financed by Croatian Ministry of Science, Education and Sports, 
p. 320, 2012. 
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The first and second Electricity Directives managed to achieve a certain level 
of the desired liberalization of the electricity market, even though few could dispute 
the process hadn’t yet been completed. 56 Overviewing the above projects we would 
come to the following conclusions: to begin with a) national monopolies gave their 
seat to new private megamonopolies – oligopolies57, b)  the first of the two Directives 
imposed the unbundling of generation and transmission, while the second prescribed 
the unbundling of distribution and retailing, separating potentially competitive 
segments of the industry from the natural monopoly segments58, furthermore c) the 
idea of an internal European electricity market proved to be multidimensional and as a 
result neither solidarity, nor implementation mechanisms among Member States were 
strong enough for its achievement, let alone the significant differences in organization 
and operation of each market that made the above venture seem more unrealistic, 59c)  
since the opening of the market less than 20% of the buyers of each country have 
changed their supplier of electricity with respect to low electricity costs or due to 
absence of real competition in supply activity 60 d) the long periods of return of the 
dependence of the project’s success on everyday market risks, resulting into the 
absence of necessary activities and delay in construction of minimally required 
transmission and production capacities. 
C.THE SITUATION AFTER THE TWO ELECTRICITY DIRECTIVES 
Although the progress already made was significant, the market opening 
objectives hadn’t yet been achieved since there were still barriers restraining free 
competition. Electricity wholesale prices raised arbitrarily, entry barriers and limited 
                                                          
56 G. Majstrović, Implementation and Perspectives of Electricity Market, Nafta, 59,11, 
p. 546, 2008. 
57  G. Majstrović, Implementation and Perspectives of Electricity Market, Nafta, 
59,11, p. 546, 2008.  
58 Jean Michel Glachant, Francois Leveque, Electricity Reform in Europe Towards a 
Single Energy Market, p. 72, 2009, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. 
59  G. Majstrović, Implementation and Perspectives of Electricity Market, Nafta, 
59,11, p. 546, 2008. 
60  G. Majstrović, Implementation and Perspectives of Electricity Market, Nafta, 
59,11, p. 546, 2008. 
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exercise of the costumer’s right to choose, forced the Commission to open an inquiry 
regarding the function of the European electricity markets in June 2005, so as an 
assessment of the existing competitive conditions and the detected market 
malfunctioning was made. 61  It was found that urgent action was needed in (1) 
achieving the effective unbundling of network-supply activities, (2) in filling 
regulatory gaps, in (3) the enhancement of market transparency and finally in (4) the 
enumeration and comprehension of the reasons that provoke market concentration and 
barriers to entry.62 
D.THE THIRD ENERGY PACKAGE 
As a consequence, the Third Energy Package was issued in 2009 consistent of 
two Directives on electricity and gas markets (2009/72/EC and 2009/73/EC) and three 
Regulations as regards the conditions for access to gas transmission networks, the 
cross-border electricity exchanges network and the creation of the Agency for the 
Cooperation of Energy Regulators.63 Both the aforementioned Directives introduced 
new rules on the unbundling of TSO’s and DSO’s.64 
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D.1.WHAT IS UNBUNDLING 
As far as the unbundling of enterprises acting in the energy market is 
concerned, it is the distinct exercise of natural monopoly activities  by an integrated 
undertaking, in other words the separation of transportation and transmission of 
electricity from the competitive activities of generation and trade of electricity. 65 It 
constitutes a strictly necessary measure for the specific market to be liberalized66 and 
according to relevant studies of the European Union, as long as the unbundling is 
insufficient not only is competition restrained67 but also various risks are involved . 68 
The main goal of the European Union is the protection of European citizens’ 
right to be supplied in energy, in a safe and price-friendly way, even though at that 
time gas and petroleum prices were dramatically rising and investments in the energy 
sector were scarce.69 The up-to-that-date unbundling rules dictated that undertakings 
controlling the energy generation made it hard for new companies to use the latter’s 
pipework systems and power cables in order to access the market.70 As a result, it was 
highly important for these new companies to be protected by the adoption of new 
unbundling rules, so that they can easily enter the markets and have the ability to 
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choose and change suppliers if they want to. In other words, effective unbundling 
means effective freedom of choice. 71 
To make things clear, if a vertically integrated undertaking functioned without 
having separated its monopolistic activities from the competitive ones, the 
administrative branch of the undertaking could be non-transparent, partial and 
discriminatory, setting unnecessary prerequisites against the trading/generating 
branch.72   The administrator could possibly hide necessary information regarding 
elements that private persons need to know in order to perform their activities, 
competing the vertically integrated undertaking in an unequal way.73 Those hidden 
pieces of information could be, the clients names of that undertaking, the measurers, 
the consumption and other elements the undertaking incorrectly considers to be 
confidential. 74 The aforementioned could restrain third party access and demotivate 
new players from entering the system and the grids. The situation could become even 
more dangerous as regards electricity markets, on condition that the vertically 
integrated undertaking was simultaneously a dominant market palyer.75 
Another issue coming up when competitive and monopolistic activities are not 
separated are the high network charges and the cross-subsidies among branches of the 
same vertically integrated undertaking.76 As a consequence, use charges can be very 
high when it comes to new-comers on the market, whereas the insufficient unbundling 
of an administrative vertically integrated company could give rise to favorable 
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treating towards its own production units as far as the allocation of units of the 
independent producers of electricity is concerned. 77 
The essential principle of all pieces of European legislation relating to the 
electricity regulatory framework, which is also confirmed by the Third Energy 
Package, goes as follows: “Any competent administrator is obliged to provide its 
service qualitatively, unhindered and in reasonable prices towards any user, 
notwithstanding the fact that it must be provided  equally, in a non-discriminatory 
basis.” 78  The European Union has made considerable efforts to safeguard the 
abovementioned doctrine, among which the adoption of unbundling in the “Second 
Electricity Directives” in order to take the necessary constitutional measures for the 
creation of an internal energy market, in which competition would thrive and at the 
same time, security of transactions and legal certainty would be assured.79 
D.3. COMPONENTS OF THE UNBUNDLING 
I would now like to highlight the components of unbundling. First of all, it is 
the legal separation of the Transmission System Operator (TSO) and the Distribution 
System Operator (DSO) from other, irrelevant to transmission and distribution 
activities, the functional unbundling and the accounting unbundling.80 
D.4.LEGAL UNBUNDLING 
In the context of legal unbundling, we first have to highlight that it only 
applies to vertically integrated undertakings. A vertically integrated undertaking is at 
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the same time involved in generation or supply of electricity81, the network operation 
is either done within the same legal structure or in a legally separate network 
company which is still under the control of the supply/production company82 and the 
separate network company that controls the supply/generation company, is thus at the 
same time a holding company .83 The administrator of the electricity transmission 
system which is part of a vertically integrated  undertaking, has to be independent, at 
least regarding its legal personality, organization and decision making from other 
activities of the undertaking that have nothing to do with transmission. 84 85In case the 
transmission branch remains part of the vertically integrated undertaking, guarantees 
of independence are required.86 Articles 14 and following of the Legal Act 2773/99, 
transposed the aforementioned to the Greek legal system and established a distinct 
legal person, the Administrator of the Greek Electricity Transmission System S.A 
(DESMIE) which remained in a vertically integrated undertaking’ s ownership, 
named PPC S.A. 87  
D.5.FUNCTIONAL UNBUNDLING 
Functional unbundling, that is also applicable on condition that we have to do 
with a vertically integrated undertaking, mandates that the administrators of the 
electricity transmission system are independent and autonomous, not only in terms of 
organization but also in decision making, towards the generation and trading interests 
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of the undertaking.88 In order to achieve that, it is highly important that there is an 
establishment of administrative, directive and supervisory structures of the 
Transmission System Operators which are fully independent from the respective 
structures of trading and generation. 89  One decisive criterion for the correct 
application of the functional unbundling rules is the degree of control that the 
undertaking with the competitive activity has on the undertaking with the 
monopolistic activity. To elaborate, the bodies responsible for the transmission of 
electricity are not allowed to participate in the structures of the vertically integrated 
undertaking, whereas those bodies’ interests have to be respected and protected in 
such a way that their independent action is definitely ensured. 90 Furthermore, the 
people appointing those bodies must have substantive powers in decision making 
regarding the necessary resources for function, maintenance and development of the 
system and the grids, whereas the mother company maintains the co-ordination 
mechanisms ensuring the protection of the latter’s economic and supervising rights, 
concerning its subsidiary’s efficiency of resources.91Finally, the administrator of the 
transmission system has to establish compliance programmes setting out measures 
that have to be taken in order to ensure that discriminatory conduct is excluded and 
the programme’s observance is monitored.92   
D.6.ACCOUNTING UNBUNDLING 
In order to prevent conducts that undermine competition, cross-subsidization, 
discriminatory tariffs and discrimination among different clients, the European 
legislator also established accounting unbundling, which is the least drastic form of 
                                                          
88 Theodore Panagos, The Unbundling In The Energy Sector Companies, Sakkoulas 
Editions, p.59, 2011. 
89 Theodore Panagos, The Unbundling In The Energy Sector Companies, Sakkoulas 
Editions, p.59, 2011. 
90  Directive 2009/72/EC, Article 19. 
91  Theodore Panagos, The Unbundling In The Energy Sector Companies, Sakkoulas 
Editions, p.60-61, 2011. 
92 Theodore Panagos, The Unbundling In The Energy Sector Companies, Sakkoulas 
Editions, p. 61, 2011. 
23 
 
unbundling.93 Pursuant to that, undertakings performing in the field of electricity shall 
keep separate accounts for each of their generation, transmission, distribution and 
trading activities,94in a way as if they were carried out by separate undertakings.95 The 
internal accounts shall include a  balance sheet and  a profit and loss account for each 
activity. 96The competent authority to approve the methodology of application of this 
accounting unbundling is the relevant “Cooperation Of Energy Regulators”97 whereas 
the prerequisites that the Greek legislature has set out for a company to be subject to 
that sort of unbundling are: a) to be a fully integrated undertaking, b) to act in the field 
of electricity and finally c) to have the relevant licence for the generation, trading, 
transmission or distribution of electricity. 
E.THE UNBUNDLING OF TSOs 
There is a whole controversy as far as the unbundling of the Transmission 
System Operators is concerned. The Third Energy Package introduced three 
different models that could be adopted by TSOs, so as not only are they well-
organized, but also provide system security, promote a spirit of cooperation between 
TSOs, regulators and market parties, let alone the fact that this diversity of choices 
could encourage innovation in the specific field. The reason behind the various 
considerations for the choice of the best model is that it has to safeguard the neutrality 
of the TSOs towards the entrance of third parties to the grids.98 
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E.1.CERTIFICATION PROCEDURE 
Before the examination of the models we should write a few words about the 
certification procedure which is the same irrespectively of the TSO model chosen. 
Article 10 of the 2009/72/EC Directive mandates the details of the procedure. The 
competent regulatory authorities of every Member State monitor the compliance of 
every TSO to the rules of Article 9 (that are explained below) in the following ways: 
Either the TSO on its own initiative, asks for a reassessment of its compliance due to 
future transactions, or ex officio the regulatory authority initiates the certification 
procedures after being informed of scheduled changes, etc. 99 Finally, another 
incentive for the initiation of such a procedure could be a request from the Energy 
Community Secreteriat.100The decision on whether a TSO should be certified must be 
issued in approximately a four month period and silence would be considered as 
certification granting.101 
E.2.OWNERSHIP UNBUNDLING 
The first suggested model is that of the ownership unbundling. In 
compliance with that model, an undertaking is at the same time the owner and TSO of 
a transmission system. In that case, the undertaking would be first responsible to treat 
the system users in a non discriminatory way regarding third party access, 
furthermore collect access and congestion charges on the one hand and payments via 
its compensation mechanisms on the other, together with maintaining and developing 
the network system and ensuring the ability of the system to meet market 
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demands. 102 Pursuant to that model, a person cannot exercise control over an 
undertaking performing any of the production or supply functions, and simultaneously 
control or exercise any right over a TSO or a transmission system.103 104And vice 
versa, a person exercising control over a TSO, is not entitled to control or exercise 
any right over an undertaking performing any of the functions of production or 
supply.105 
When it comes to “control”, we mean nothing different from the meaning that  
Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings (‘the EC Merger Regulation’), has given to 
control.106 Pursuant to Article 3(2) EC Merger Regulation, control can be exercised 
through rights, contracts and other means in a manner that suggests decisive influence 
over an undertaking. 107  Accordingly, decisive influence could arise either from 
ownership and rights to use the undertaking’s assets, or from rights and contracts 
conferring decisive influence regarding the organization and decision making of an 
undertaking.108 
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 Article 9(1)(b)(i) of Directive 2009/72/EC also refers to “person” and 
“rights”. By “person” this Article encompasses not only individuals, but also 
companies, private/public sector entities. Even more specifically, the “person” would 
usually be either the company responsible for the supply or network operation activity 
or a parent company with subsidiaries acting as suppliers or network operators.109 On 
the other hand, the abstract concept of “rights” could possibly include a vast variety 
of rights such as voting rights, appointing rights, administrative rights, rights of legal 
representation and holding of majority shares. Article 9(1)(b) specifies the concept of 
shareholding even more, setting some mandatory prerequisites that need to be met in 
case a supplier keeps a shareholding in  a network operator.110 First the shareholding 
cannot be a majority share. Furthermore, voting rights relating to the shareholding 
cannot be directly/indirectly exercised by the supplier, neither is the supplier capable 
of appointing members of the supervisory or the administrative board, nor can he 
exercise any sort of control over the network operator or the network system.  In the 
opposite case, where a TSO reserves a supplier shareholding, the same cumulative 
conditions need to apply.111   
Similarly, Article 9(1)(c) underpins that a “person”, exercising control or any 
sort of rights in a supply/generation undertaking cannot exercise decisive powers in 
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the appointment of members of the administrative board, the supervisory board, or 
legally representing bodies of a TSO or a transmission system. 112  The incentive 
behind this is the avoidance of concentration of powers in a single entity, in other 
words, the avoidance of situations where a parent company participating in the field 
of supply, even slightly, also participates in the nomination of TSO members.113 On 
the same wavelength, the same person cannot simultaneously be a board member of a 
supplier and a TSO.114 
Three clarifications regarding ownership unbundling are also important. First, 
we should underpin that although the above rules apply both to electricity and gas 
sectors, interdependency between those two different fields in a way that the same 
person is both an electricity supplier and a gas TSO, or a gas supplier and an 
electricity TSO is unacceptable. 115   Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that the 
ownership unbundling rules equally apply to both private and public entities and if for 
example two separate public bodies operate in the field of generation and 
transmission, thought needs to be given on whether they are under the common 
influence of a third public entity.116 In that case they should all comply with the 
aforementioned rules. Finally, Article 9(5) of Directive 2009/72/EC refers to the case 
where TSOs that are ownership unbundled create a joint undertaking, functioning as a 
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TSO in more than one Member States.117 According to the European Legislator that 
legal arrangement escapes the regulatory framework set out in Article 9(1)(a), as 
explained above.118 
 Making an assessment of the Ownership Unbundling we would find both 
some benefits and costs. To begin with we should definitely consider its effect on 
competition since ownership unbundling reduces discrimination conduct against non-
integrated competitors.119 Nevertheless, it might possibly make space for mergers of 
generation undertakings because of the fact that the selling of vertically unbundled 
transmission assets could become financial resources for horizontal integration.120 
Another thing we could also consider as an advantage of the ownership unbundling is 
the promotion of transparency among network and competitive businesses resulting 
into facilitation and effectiveness of regulation.121 On the second point, a potential 
disadvantage could be the increase of regulatory oversight requirements as far as 
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transactions between unbundled parts of the electricity production are concerned.122 
Regarding security of supply, it can have beneficial effect on forcing transmission 
companies to actually get improved and even incentivize better information 
systems.123 It can also, on one hand reduce the costs of transactions and on the other, 
increase computing system costs for the coordination of transmission sector. On a 
similar basis, power contracts may have to be renegotiated, conferring significant 
costs to the undertakings, especially when the parties are from different countries and 
essential wealth transfers may diminish the national social welfare. 124 Ultimately, the 
risk of erratic governmental  interference is smaller seeing that after the reformed 
framework introduced by the Third Energy Package, governments will be less willing 
to initiate alteration and renovation programmes. 125 
  E.3. INDEPENDENT SYSTEM OPERATOR (ISO) 
The second model a Transmission System Operator could adopt is the 
Independent System Operator (ISO). What should first be stated is that it also applies 
only to vertically integrated undertakings which may have their seat in the same or 
different Member States, as long as they are operating in at least one of the fields of 
transmission or distribution of electricity together with either generation or supply of 
the latter.126 Now it’s high time we examined the ISO model step by step and in detail. 
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Due to Article 13(1) and (3) of the Directive 2009/72/EC, the proposal of the model 
has to be done by the owner of the interested transmission system. 127Thereafter, the 
interested Member State has to approve the Independent System Operator and 
designate it as such128, only on condition that the prerequisites listed in Article 13 (2) 
of the Directive are fully complied. 129 
 In order an ISO to be certified, the Regulatory Authority of each Member 
State has to make sure that the interested undertaking complies first with the rules of 
Article 11 of the Directive 2009/72/EC and then with the conditions set out in Article 
13(2) of the latter. 130 The operator is required to adhere to the rules of ownership 
unbundling of Article 9(1)(b), (c) and (d) of the 2009/72/EC Directive that were 
developed above. Secondly, the operator has to demonstrate its financial, technical, 
physical and human resources sufficiency in order to achieve the goals set out in 
Article 12.131 The operator is moreover obliged to follow and demonstrate its ability 
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to comply with a ten-year development plan designed and surveilled by each Member 
State’s regulatory authority, whereas the owner of the transmission system must 
demonstrate its ability and attitude to follow the rules set out in Article 13(5). 132At 
this point I would like to highlight, that the burden of proof for the fulfillment of the 
above conditions is either on the electricity transmission operator or on the system 
owner and by no means on the regulatory authority.133 
The tasks of an Independent System Operator are first the tasks of a regular 
TSO. Particularly, every ISO is responsible for the granting and monitoring of 
third party access 134  which contains access charges collection, collection of 
congestion charges, along with payments through the internal compensation 
mechanism of the TSO.135 Furthermore, the ISO is responsible for the operation, 
maintenance and development of the transmission system as well as any other task 
that suits a transmission system operator.136 As far as investments are concerned, the 
ISO is fully responsible to safeguard the systemic ability to satisfy the market demand 
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via investment planning. 137  In other words, at the point of development of the 
transmission system the ISO has to obtain all the necessary authorizations regarding 
the construction and assignation of new infrastructure. 138 Needless to say, the system 
owner is again out of the investment planning context. 139 
On the other hand, the tasks and obligations of the owner of the transmission 
system are various and different and they are all listed in Article 13(5) of the 
2009/72/EC Directive. 140  First, the owner of the system has to be collaborative 
towards the ISO and conduct cooperative activities in order to help the latter fulfill its 
tasks.141  The system owner is liable for all the assets of the network except for 
liability related to the tasks of the independent system operator. 142Pursuant to that, 
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the owner of the network will be responsible for the good or bad condition of the 
network and its performance, but won’t be responsible for the system’s management 
which as above explained is on ISO’s responsibility. 143 
The network’s financing is traditionally on the network owner’s responsibility. 
According to that, the system owner is required to finance the investments decided by 
the ISO, but not all of them. 144Only the investments complying with the conditions 
the regulatory authority of each Member State demands in order to give its approval 
are financed by the network owner.145 The owner has the discretion not to finance an 
investment, but still must give its agreement for the investment’s finance even in the 
case that the sponsor is the ISO itself.146 However, in that case, the new parts of the 
system are not going to be under its ownership. 147 The financial issues are after all 
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also subject to the regulatory authority’s approval and the latter is entrusted with the 
obligation to give its consultations whenever needed.148 
Article 37 (3) of Directive 2009/72/EC lays down all the obligations of the 
regulatory authorities when a TSO is ISO designated. Along with the certification 
duties, regulatory authorities have plenty of responsibilities.149 As we have already 
stated, the regulatory authorities first have to keep an eye not only on the system 
owner’s and the TSO’s adherence to the rules, but also on the communications 
between those two entities.150 Regulatory authorities are responsible to examine the 
contracts between the above two, act as a mediating authority when there are disputes 
that need settlement and especially when it comes to complaints submitted pursuant to 
Article 37(11).151 They are also empowered to approve the investment planning and 
the pluriannual network development plan that the ISO presents.152 On a similar basis, 
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the regulatory authorities monitor the use of congestion charges153 and make sure that 
the network access tariffs ISOs collect contain remuneration for the owner of the 
system. 154  This remuneration is required for the network assets and for new 
investments made in the network. 155 They moreover are competent to exercise 
inspections and supervise even without prior announcement the system owner and the 
ISO.156 On condition that the latter violate their obligations, with respect to Article 
37(4)(d), penalties of non-compliance accordant to the proportionality principle are 
issued against the infringer.157 
One final requirement of the ISO model is the unbundling of the transmission 
system owner. Article 14(1) of the 2009/72/EC Directive explicitly requires that the 
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transmission system owner is legally unbundled while Article 14(2) highlights the 
need for functional unbundling of the latter. 158 Unbundling of accounts is also 
mentioned in Article 31 of the Directive as necessary for the system owner. 
E.4. INDEPENDENT TRANSMISSION OPERATOR (ITO) 
The Third Unbundling Model is that of Independent Transmission Operator 
(ITO). Applying only to vertically integrated undertakings, according to the ITO 
model, the TSO can remain its part under a vast variety of rules. 159 The ITO must be 
autonomous, meaning that it has to be able to exist and function as an independent 
organism, a self-governing entity, fitted out with its own economic, technical, 
physical and human resources that are needed to succeed in fulfilling its obligation of 
electricity transmission. 160 Article 17(2) of the 2009/72/EC Directive encompasses 
the most important activities of a TSO under the ITO model, (referring also to Article 
12 which sets out the activities of a TSO in general) 161  among which, the 
representation of the TSO in its conducts with third parties, the representation of the 
TSO in the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity, the 
equal granting and management of third party access, the collection of charges, the 
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preservation of good function, maintenance and development of the transmission 
system, the drafting of  investment planning, the establishment of the appropriate 
types of joint undertakings, the exercise of corporate services.162 
The assets of the network system and generally any sort of assets necessary for 
the electricity transmission must belong to the ITO’s ownership. 163  The required 
amount of human resources has to be employed by the ITO, while the corporate 
services have to be carried out on a day-to-day basis, by qualified personnel also 
employed by the ITO.164 Exceptionally and as long as the ITO had already employed 
sufficient number of people, it can cooperate with third-party service providers, as 
regards the exercise of corporate services and repair services. 165 At this point it is 
important to point out that, responsibilities of the ITO exclusively belong to the latter 
and cannot be transferred for example to another ITO, whereas the aforementioned 
required autonomy of an ITO is not full but relative, since the ancillary activities that 
have nothing to do with the electricity transmission, can also be carried out by people 
that are not ITO’s employees.166 
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According to Article 17(1)(c), the ITO can provide its services towards other 
sectors of the vertically integrated undertaking it belongs to, under the preconditions 
that; a) this provision of services is equal and not discriminatory against other users of 
the system, b) generation and supply are not restricted to compete and c) the 
competent regulatory authorities have approved the aforementioned provision of 
services. 167 Furthermore, the ITO must be the exclusive owner of its equipment, its 
location place and security systems and cannot cooperate with the same consultants as 
other sections of the vertically integrated undertaking. 168  Its financing for future 
investment projects and new assets comes from other sectors of the same vertically 
integrated undertaking, 169  since the request has been appropriately submitted, 
approved by the Supervisory Body170 and has been taken into consideration by the 
competent regulatory authority.171172 
Due to Article 17(3) the ITO has to be organized in the legal form of a limited 
liability company. 173  The ITO’s corporate identity, location, branding and other 
elements that particularize it, have to be clear and undisputable, creating neither 
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misunderstandings, nor confusion to consumers. 174  Consumers should be able to 
identify the difference and independency of the ITO towards the vertically integrated 
undertaking. 175With respect to its independency, the ITO must have the exclusive 
right to make decisions concerning not only the assets required for the function, 
maintenance and expansion of the transmission system, but also the determination of 
its competitive conduct. 176  Article 20 of the Directive under judgment further 
specifies the above principle; First, the ITO ought to have the power to raise money 
on the financial market.177 Production and supply subsidiaries are not allowed to hold 
shares of the ITO and vice versa the ITO cannot hold shares or receive dividends by 
any electricity generating or supplying undertaking. 178Complying with market terms 
and conditions, the ITO must inform the competent regulatory authority about any 
loans or other formally agreed financial relations with other sections of the vertically 
integrated undertaking.179 Finally, other parts of the vertically integrated undertaking 
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ought not to impede the ITO from complying with its obligations and compliance 
programme it has drafted itself.180 
Not only the ITO itself, but also its staff and management must conform to the 
independency guarantees of Article 19.  When talking about management we mean 
the executive managers or any board member except for the supervisory body, which 
is the body in charge of the ITO’s management and its decisions are notified to the 
regulatory authority before becoming binding.181 More specifically, for three years 
before the TSO’s management appointment any activity exercised towards any part of 
the vertically integrated undertaking but the TSO is unacceptable.182(This rule applies 
only for the majority of the staff). Accordingly, the personnel constituting integral 
part of the ITO’s management together with its employees, can neither have any other 
professional position, interest or responsibility within the vertically integrated 
business, nor receive economic benefits from other sectors of the latter.183 Finally, the 
aforementioned staff must respect its duty of allegiance towards the ITO and for four 
years after their term of office, not have any type of link with any part of the vertically 
integrated undertaking. 184 
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Another important aspect of the ITO model is the appointment of a 
Supervisory Body, which is going to be the Head of decision making as regards the 
assets of the ITO’s shareholders.185 On the other hand, it cannot interfere with the 
regular management of the ITO, the network management or the drafting of the multi-
annual network development plan. 186  Pursuant to Article 20(3) half of the 
Supervisory Board Members minus one have to comply with the following rules; a) 
any issue relating to the term of office of those members has to be notified to the 
regulatory authority which safeguards their independence,187 b) three years before 
their appointment the people constituting the Supervisory Board personnel are 
required not to perform any sort of activity within the vertically integrated 
undertaking,188 c) the staff of the Supervisory Board ought not to possess any other 
status along the vertically integrated undertaking, 189 d) nor receive any financial 
                                                          
185  Commission Staff Working Paper Interpretative Note On Directive 2009/72/EC 
Concerning Common Rules For The Internal Market In Electricity And 
Directive2009/73/EC Concerning Common Rules For The Internal Market In Natural 
Gas The Unbundling Regime, p.17,2010. 
186   Commission Staff Working Paper Interpretative Note On Directive 2009/72/EC 
Concerning Common Rules For The Internal Market In Electricity And 
Directive2009/73/EC Concerning Common Rules For The Internal Market In Natural 
Gas The Unbundling Regime, p.17,2010. 
187 Commission Staff Working Paper Interpretative Note On Directive 2009/72/EC 
Concerning Common Rules For The Internal Market In Electricity And 
Directive2009/73/EC Concerning Common Rules For The Internal Market In Natural 
Gas The Unbundling Regime, p.20,2010. 
188 Commission Staff Working Paper Interpretative Note On Directive 2009/72/EC 
Concerning Common Rules For The Internal Market In Electricity And 
Directive2009/73/EC Concerning Common Rules For The Internal Market In Natural 
Gas The Unbundling Regime, p.20,2010. 
189 Commission Staff Working Paper Interpretative Note On Directive 2009/72/EC 
Concerning Common Rules For The Internal Market In Electricity And 
Directive2009/73/EC Concerning Common Rules For The Internal Market In Natural 
Gas The Unbundling Regime, p.20,2010. 
42 
 
benefit from the latter. Finally, for four years after the term of their office they cannot 
possess any other sort of decisive status within the whole undertaking.190 
The ITO is also responsible for the effective development of the network and 
the rationalized decision making regarding investments. So as to fulfill the above 
obligations, the ITO annually submits a ten-year plan of network development in 
order to let the market actors know which is the transmission infrastructure that needs 
to be built the following years, the investments that are necessary to be made and a 
timeframe in which this will happen, along with assumptions about the course of 
action of the electricity functions regarding other countries.191The drafting of the 
above plan has to be done under the consultations of the regulatory authority and is 
required to be published. 192 In case the ITO doesn’t fulfill its commitments for 
overriding reasons, the regulatory authority shall take some action.193 
In a nutshell, the regulatory authority undertakes specific duties as far as the 
ITO model is concerned.  Those duties are indicatively set out in Article 37(5)  and in 
few words dictate the following: First, the issuing of penalties in the case of 
discriminatory behavior in favor of the vertically integrated undertaking, 194 
surveillance of communications between the TSO and the vertically integrated 
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undertaking,195 dispute settlement between the above, monitoring of commercial and 
financial issues, 196  along with examination of contracts and agreements, 197 
justification requests towards the vertically integrated undertaking,198 carrying out of 
inspections on the premises of both the TSO and the vertically integrated 
undertaking, 199  assignment of the TSO’s activities to another one in case of 
continuous breaches especially of the non-discriminatory behavior doctrine.200 
After scrutinizing the application of all the aforementioned principles of the 
ITO unbundling, will the Commission ensure its full and effective independence. 
 
F. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE INDEPENDENT POWER 
TRANSMISSION OPERATOR (IPTO/ADMIE) 
Another innovation introduced by the Third Energy Package and particularly, 
Directive 2009/72/EC and implemented in compliance with  Law 4001/2011, was the 
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establishment of The Independent Power Transmission Operator (IPTO or ADMIE) 
S.A. Pursuant to that Law, ADMIE is the undertaking responsible for the transmission 
of electricity in the Hellenic Electricity Transmission System, in other words it is the 
Transmission System Operator for Greece.201 It assumed its role of system operator 
on 1st February 2012, when the System Operation Code of 2012 came into force.202 Its 
duties include the conservation and development of the system’s operation so as to 
safeguard the safety, efficiency and reliability of electricity supply. 203 ADMIE is in 
PPC’s full ownership. PPC is a vertically integrated power generation and electricity 
supply company, which is both   state-owned (51.12 per cent) and owned by not only 
private and institutional investors but also pension funds (48.88 per cent), through its 
listing on the Athens and London Stock Exchanges. 204  However it is entirely 
independent from PPC as regards its operation and management and hence has 
retained all its decision-making as laid down by Law 4001/2011 and Directive 
2009/72/EC.205   
F.1. THE STORY OF PRIVATIZATION OF ADMIE 
After the privatization of DESFA, which was the Greek Natural Gas System 
Operator, in August 2013, the Independent Power Transmission Operator would be 
the second entity of the energy sector imminent to be privatized206. Due to its 11,300 
km of transmission lines with the potential of further expansion and interconnection, 
IPTO constitutes a promising infrastructure for European energy investors. 207 
Initiated with a view to the enhancement of the country’s credibility after Greece’s 
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public debt crisis of 2010, the privatization aimed both at the attraction of direct 
investment and significant flow of capital to the infrastructure.208 But we shouldn’t 
face IPTO’s privatization as mere sale of public assets. On the contrary, the Hellenic 
Republic Asset Development Fund S.A. (HRADF or the Fund), which is the entity 
running the project, struggled to maintain professionalism and efficiency of the 
programme on high levels along with discouraging the government from unnecessary 
interventions. 209  IPTO’s assets could be categorized into three groups: company 
shares, real estate and voting rights. After transferred to the Fund, they could be sold, 
developed or liquidated. 210 
The responsibilities of an Independent Transmission Operator have already 
been analyzed above; hence I won’t come to details regarding its scope and 
responsibilities. In a very succinct and concentrated presentation I would say that 
ADMIE is responsible for the insurance of the system’s ability to meet reasonable 
electricity demand, it is fully responsible for an efficient and environmentally healthy 
transmission system let alone its safeguarding role of the system’s security of supply, 
adequacy and systemic reliability.211 It furthermore grants access to the system to 
third parties, provides network interconnection and is the manager cross-border flows 
of electricity, settles system imbalances, compensates generation capacities at 
regulated prices, etc.212 As far as the charges attributable to the transmission services 
provided are concerned, they are set by IPTO and approved by the Regulatory 
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Authority for Energy in Greece. 213 Every March IPTO drafts the system development 
programme for the following decade and submits it to RAE for approval.214  
Pursuant to the Greek economic adjustment programme, the Greek 
government announced the restructuring and privatization of PPC. This project would 
include full separation of IPTO from PPC and IPTO’s partial privatization in two 
phases: First, IPTO’s share capital would be increased through a share purchase 
agreement.215 After the separation the hypothetical investor would hold 51 per cent of 
IPTO’s shares and have operational control, whereas PPC’s shareholding would come 
to 49 per cent, which was considered as a rather unattractive proposal.216  After that, 
the plan was revised and was decided that sale of 66 per cent of IPTO’s shareholding 
would be made in an international tender. 217According to that plan, the State of 
Greece would retain a minority stake of 34 per cent of IPTO directly and not through 
PPC.218 
F.2.THE END OF THE STORY 
Around the mids of 2014, international tender procedures for the sale of the 66 
per cent stake in IPTO were going very well but a little behind the schedule. 219The 
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tender’s candidates, Terna, SGCC, Elia, and PSP were fully interested and there had 
arisen legitimate expectations for a good deal.220 However, despite this prosperous 
climate, the project is about to run aground for two reasons.221 First because of the 
legal action union groups have taken against PPC, claiming unconstitutionality of the 
foregoing project and accusing PPC for withholding workers’ contributions in order 
to sponsor its project.222 Another reason causing the derail of the project would be 
political instability due to the appointment of a new President, 223 which came true on 
the 25TH of January 2015, after the early called national elections. 224 
And as if the aforementioned were not enough, the new Minister of Production 
Reconstruction, Mr. Panagiotis Lafazanis stated that the new government will directly 
freeze any privatization relating to PPC and specifically the privatization of ADMIE, 
because they do not believe in the efficiency of privatizations relating to 
infrastructures that assist the development of a country,225giving an unfortunate end to 
a far-reaching project. 
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